DAC Economy
  • DAC Economy
  • Table of Contents
  • Introduction
  • Part I
    • Superpower is a curse
    • Scale-out vs. Scale-up
      • The Scale-out Path
      • The Scale-up Path
    • Blockchain Scalability
  • Part II
    • Economics vs. Economy
    • Chaos is a Ladder to Many Skills
      • Let's cure the economic digestive disorder
      • Entropy, Life and Blockchain
    • DAC Economy - The Metis Way
      • Trinity vs. Unity
      • Repurposing DAO to align the stars
    • To Adapt is to Innovate
  • Part III
    • DAC Gardeners Need Bees to Grow a Garden
      • Side-Effects
      • Bees At Your Service
    • Square Peg in a Round Hole
      • Trade-Offs and Compromises
      • Split Concerns Across DAC Dimensions
      • Dynamics of Decentralized Security (Safety)
    • Information is not a Time Machine
      • Arrow of Time and Embodiment of Value
      • Embodiment of Decentralized Incentive and Decentralized Identity
      • Token Engineering vs. Value Engineering
    • Metamorphoses of DAC Economy
      • The Metaverse vs. The Dacmos
      • Simulation Hypothesis vs. Decentralized Cosmogeny
      • Reputation, Oracles and Bridges
  • Epilogue
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  1. Part III

Square Peg in a Round Hole

Developers from the traditional domain are often caught off guard with the hardship in software design on the decentralized blockchain. The most frustrating part is mechanism design. In traditional centralized environment, developers can make strong rational assumptions about human behaviors, so much that one wouldn’t even need to worry about mechanism at all – that’s why most developers are not familiar with this aspect of decentralized blockchain development. Indeed, in a centralized environment, mostly developers wouldn’t need to worry about bad actors beyond access-control, since centralized institutions can deal with bad behaviors in an escalated order externally:

  1. (a) Moderately permissioned and access-controlled systems can deter moderate bad behaviors by external means – the legal system (remember EULA⁵⁸ ?) and the police.

  2. (b) Strictly permissioned and access-controlled systems can employ extra security measures (e.g., security clearance tokens, physical barriers, armed guards) against bad actors that won’t be easily deterred by power institutions.

  3. (c) When all failed, as a last resort businesses could recoup their financial losses through insurance policies, though intangible losses are hard to recoup sometimes, e.g., loss of brand power after a data breach.

  4. (d) Every so often the last resort – insurance policies – can fail in a stupendous fashion⁵⁹. In such situation the real last resort of the centralized system is to simply cheat – bail out the big houses too big to fail and throw everyone else under the bus.

On the decentralized blockchain, developers don’t have any of those external measures to guard against bad behaviors and must build security algorithmically by employing mechanism design themselves.

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Last updated 3 years ago